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The experience of the past two decades, including most recently the global
 nancial turmoil triggered by the collapse of the subprime mortgage mar-
ket in the United States, has made painfully clear that abrupt reversals in
short-term capital movements tend to exacerbate  nancial volatility and may
lead to full-blown crises. Although misaligned domestic fundamentals (in the
form of either overvalued exchange rates, excessive short-term foreign bor-
rowing, or growing  scal and current account imbalances) usually play an
important role in  nancial crises, they have called attention to the inherent
instability of international  nancial markets and the risks that cross-border
 nancial transactions–facilitated by dramatic technological advances–can
pose for countries with relatively fragile  nancial systems, weak regulatory
and supervision structures, and policy regimes that lack  exibility.1
In this vein, the post-crisis global excess liquidity caused by the expan-
sionary monetary policies of advanced reserve currency-issuing countries has
brought to policymakers in many middle-income countries–as well as in
small industrial countries like Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland–the chal-
lenge of managing large amounts of capital in ows while preserving an inde-
pendent monetary policy to keep macro and  nancial stability at home. In-
deed, “sudden  oods” of private capital have been a source of macroeconomic
instability in many of these countries, as a result of rapid credit and monetary
expansion (due to the di culty and cost of pursuing sterilization policies),
real exchange rate appreciation, and widening current account de cits. In
particular, the surge in capital  ows to Latin America between early 2009 and
mid 2011 has induced booms in credit and equity markets in many countries
and raised concerns about asset price bubbles and  nancial fragility.2 Sus-
tained growth, abundant global liquidity and large interest rate di erentials
have attracted substantial in ows of capital, which have led to real appreci-
ation, rapid credit growth, an expansion in economic activity, and pressures
1See Agénor (2012) for an overview of the evidence. Terms-of-trade  uctuations can
generate sizable output and employment e ects, which may increase exchange rate volatil-
ity and exacerbate movements in short-term capital  ows.
2Under a  exible exchange rate, growing external de cits tend to bring about a currency
depreciation, which may eventually lead to a realignment of relative prices and induce self-
correcting movements in trade  ows. However, sharp swings in capital  ows make it more
di cult for the central bank to strike a balance between its di erent objectives; in turn,
this may lead to exchange rate volatility.
3on asset prices.3 The scope for responding to the risk of macroeconomic and
 nancial instability through monetary policy is somewhat limited, because
higher domestic interest rates vis-à-vis zero interest  oors prevailing in ad-
vanced economies may exacerbate the  ood of private capital. So far, other
measures (such as direct taxes on  xed income and equity in ows, and for-
eign exchange market intervention) have had some success but created other
challenges related to the reaction of long-term investors vis-à-vis the overall
policy stance.
A key issue therefore is, and continues to be, to identify short-term policy
responses that can help to mitigate the impact of external  nancial shocks,
in an environment where the use of short-term policy rates has to balance
internal and external stability objectives. This paper focuses on the role of
macroprudential regulation in mitigating the macroeconomic and  nancial
instability that may be associated with sudden  oods in private capital, in
particular foreign bank borrowing. We do so not because of the size of bank-
related capital  ows–even though these  ows have accounted at times for a
highly signi cant share of cross-border capital movements.4 Rather, it is be-
cause our goal is to highlight the role of banks in transmitting external shocks
and the risk that capital  ows, intermediated directly through the banking
system, may lead to the formation of credit-fueled bubbles and foster  nancial
instability. To conduct our analysis, we dwell on the closed-economy model
with credit market imperfections described in Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da
Silva (2011). A key feature of that model is a direct link between house prices
and credit growth, via the impact of housing wealth on collateral and interest
rate spreads. We extend it in several directions. First, we consider an open
economy where capital is imperfectly mobile internationally–an assumption
that accords well with the evidence for developing countries (see Agénor and
Montiel (2008)). Domestic private borrowers face an upward-sloping supply
curve of funds on world capital markets, and internalize the e ect of capital
3Episodes of large capital in ows in Latin America and elsewhere have not been sys-
tematically associated with increases in in ation. A key reason is that in many cases
the de ationary e ect of the exchange rate appreciation associated with these in ows
(especially when a large proportion of intermediate goods is imported) has been very pro-
nounced. As discussed later, in our model this is an important aspect of the transmission
channel of external shocks.
4According to recent data by the Institute of International Finance for instance, in
2011 net in ows of private capital associated with commercial banks accounted for almost
26 percent of total net private in ows to Emerging Asia.
4market imperfections in making their portfolio decisions. Thus, unlike New
Keynesian models of the type developed by Kollman (2001), Caputo et al.
(2006), Adolfson et al. (2007, 2009), and others, the external risk premium
depends on the individual’s borrowing needs, not the economy’s overall level
of debt.5 As a result of these imperfections, the domestic bond rate continues
to be determined by the equilibrium condition of the money market, instead
of foreign interest rates (as implied by uncovered interest rate parity under
perfect capital mobility). Second, we consider a managed  oat and imper-
fect pass-through of nominal exchange rate changes to domestic prices. Both
features are well supported by the evidence.
Third, banks borrow on world capital markets, and their borrowing de-
cisions a ect the terms at which they can obtain funds–both domestically
and abroad. At the same time, domestic agents (in particular, capital good
producers), borrow only from domestic banks. These assumptions are in
contrast to many contributions in the existing literature, where it is usu-
ally assumed that  rms (or their owners, households) borrow directly on
world capital markets subject to a binding constraint determined by their
net worth.6 Most importantly, in our setting a sudden drop in the world
risk-free rate induces banks to borrow more in foreign currency. This re-
duces their domestic borrowing from the central bank and leads to a lower
real bond rate, which stimulates current consumption and the demand for
housing services. In turn, this raises real estate prices, which increases the
value of collateral that  rms can pledge and lower the loan rate, thereby
stimulating investment. Capital  oods may therefore generate an economic
boom that is magni ed by a  nancial accelerator e ect, through their impact
on the banks’ balance sheets and pricing decisions.7
5In the existing literature, to ensure a well-de ned steady-state it is common to assume
that the premium on foreign bond holdings depends on the aggregate net foreign asset
position of domestic households. Adolfson et al. (2008) also introduce the expected change
in the exchange rate in the speci cation of the premium, but this is largely arbitrary.
Alternatively, Kollintzas and Vassilatos (2000) introduce transactions costs in the foreign
sector, but they are also treated as given in the optimization process.
6See for instance Céspedes et al. (2003, 2004), Cook (2004), Choi and Cook (2004),
and Elekdag et al. (2006, 2007), Guajardo (2008), and Leblebicioglu (2009).
7Note that, in practice, nonbank  rms have also bene ted extensively from the cur-
rent global excess liquidity conditions, which poses other complex problems of  nancial
desintermediation, supervision, balance sheet imbalances and risks to  nancial instability.
These issues are not considered in our paper but nevertheless pose critical challenges to
policymakers.
5Fourth, as noted earlier, we consider the role of bank regulation as a
policy to mitigate the adverse e ects of sudden  oods. In the model, capital
regulation takes the form of a Basel III-type countercyclical rule, similar
to the rule speci ed in Agénor, Alper and Pereira da Silva (2011). It has
been argued that by raising capital requirements in a countercyclical way,
regulators could help to choke o  asset price bubbles–such as the one that
developed in the US housing market–before vulnerabilities take hold and a
crisis is created. We apply this idea to external  nancial shocks. In a way,
countercyclical regulation aims to internalize potential trade-o s between
the objectives of macroeconomic stability and  nancial stability. To measure
 nancial stability we consider a composite measure involving the volatility
of both house prices and exchange rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
model. The presentation of its closed-economy ingredients is kept as brief as
possible, given that they are described at length in Agénor, Alper, and Pereira
da Silva (2009, 2011). Instead, we focus on how the model presented here
departs from those papers, especially with respect to the  nancial sector and
the countercyclical regulatory rule. In addition, in order to focus on the issue
at hand, we make three strategic modeling choices–we adopt reduced-form
speci cations with respect to the probability of repayment and the exchange
rate pass-through e ect, and we abstract from the (empirically important)
fact that a fraction of consumers are liquidity constrained.8 The equilibrium
is characterized in Section III and some key features of the steady state are
discussed in Section IV. An illustrative calibration is presented in Section
V. The results of our base experiment, a temporary drop in the world (risk-
free) interest rate, which translates into a sudden  ood of private capital, are
described in Section VI. Optimal regulatory policy is discussed in Section
VII. Sensitivity tests, involving the degree of exchange-rate pass-through, the
nature of the reserve accumulation rule, and the response of monetary policy
to exchange rate movements, are reported in Section VIII. The last section
o ers concluding remarks and discusses some potentially fruitful directions
for future investigation.
8As noted later, accounting for the last feature would simply reinforce the results.
62T h e E c o n o m y
We consider a small open economy populated by six categories of agents: a
representative household, intermediate goods-producing (IG)  rms, a homo-
geneous  nal good (FG) producer, a capital good (CG) producer, a  nan-
cial intermediary (a bank, for short), the government, and the central bank,
which also regulates the bank.9 The country produces a continuum of in-
termediate goods, indexed by    (01), which are imperfect substitutes to
a continuum of imported intermediate goods, also indexed by    (01).I n
line with the McCallum-Nelson approach, imports are not treated as  nished
consumer goods but rather as intermediate goods, which are used (together
with domestic intermediate goods) in the production of the domestic  nal
good. This approach is quite relevant for many middle-income countries.10
The  nal good is consumed by the household and the government, used for
investment (subject to additional costs) by the CG producer, or exported.
There is monopolistic competition in intermediate goods markets; each in-
termediate good is produced or imported by a single  rm.
The household owns all domestic  rms. It supplies labor, consumes, and
holds domestic and foreign  nancial assets. It deposits funds in the bank at
the beginning of the period and collects them (with interest) at the end of the
period, after the goods market closes. It makes its housing stock available,
without any direct charge, to the CG producer, who uses it as collateral
against which it borrows from the bank to buy the  nal good for investment
purposes, produce capital, and then rent it to IG producers. IG  rms use
labor and capital as production inputs, and adjust prices toward equilibrium
markups over marginal costs of production.
The bank supplies credit to IG producers as well, who use it to  nance
their short-term working capital needs. Its supply of loans is perfectly elastic
at the prevailing lending rate. To satisfy capital regulations, it issues domes-
9The assumption of a single  nancial intermediary is made essentially to simplify no-
t a t i o n s . O u rr e s u l t sw o u l dr e m a i ne s s e n t i a l l yt h es a m ei fw ew e r et oa s s u m ei n s t e a d
monopolistic competition among a multitude of banks, and that all banks behave identi-
cally.
10In Brazil for instance, the average share of intermediate goods (including oil) in total
imports amounted to 64 percent during 2006-09; for Turkey, it exceeded 68 percent for the
same period. As noted by McCallum and Nelson (2000), an advantage of this approach
is that it avoids the assumption (implied by the tradable-nontradable dichotomy) that
export and import goods are perfectly substitutable in production. However, here the
relevant price index for produced goods is not the same as the consumer price index.
7tic nominal debt at the beginning of time , in line with the level of (risky)
loans in its portfolio.11 It also borrows on world capital markets and from
the central bank. At the end of each period, it repays with interest household
deposits and the liquidity borrowed from the central bank, and redeems in
full its domestic and foreign debt. All pro ts are then distributed, the bank
is liquidated, and a new bank opens at the beginning of the next period.
The maturity period of both categories of bank loans and the maturity
period of bank deposits is the same. In each period, loans are extended prior
to activity (production or investment) and paid o  at the end of the period.
The central bank supplies liquidity elastically to the bank and alters its policy
rate in response to in ation deviations from target and the output gap, as
well as deviations in the growth rate of an indicator of  nancial stability. It
does not engage in sterilization activities but it accumulates foreign-currency
reserves based on a rule that depends on the volume of imports and net
foreign-currency liabilities of the private sector.12 Finally, capital mobility is
imperfect.
2.1 Households
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 , the share of total time endowment
(normalized to unity) spent working, with 


 denoting the number of hours
11This is consistent with the evidence which suggests that prior to the global  nancial
crisis banks in some countries met capital requirements by issuing “hybrid” securities that
are more like debt than equity. Even though the de nition of capital has been tightened
under the new Basel III rules (only stocks and retained earnings can count as Tier 1
capital, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)), there is an ongoing debate
as to whether banks should be allowed to hold capital not only in the form of core (Tier 1)
equity but also in the form of loss-absorbing debt, such as contingent convertible bonds,
which convert into equity once a bank’s capital ratio falls below a certain level.
12As documented by Aizenman and Glick (2009), even though the degree of sterilization
(as measured by o set coe cients) has increased in recent years in many middle-income
countries, it remains imperfect–especially in Latin America. Note also that in thin and
imperfect  nancial markets, sterilized intervention often drives up interest rates on the
securities used for intervention–and this often results in even greater capital in ows. The
policy is therefore not sustainable, in addition to being costly.
8of labor provided to the intermediate-good producing  rm ,  a composite
index of real monetary assets,  the stock of housing,    (01) the sub-
jective discount factor, 0 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption, E is the expectation operator conditional on the information
available at the beginning of period ,a n d		 	  0. Housing services
are taken to be proportional to their stock.
The composite monetary asset is generated by a geometric average of
real cash balances, 	
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 is nominal cash holdings (with 
 denoting the price of
 nal goods sold on the domestic market),  = 
  nominal bank deposits,

 the price of housing,  nominal holdings of bank debt, 	
 (
	
 )n o m -
inal holdings of one-period, noncontingent domestic (foreign) government
bonds, where  is the nominal exchange rate (expressed as the domestic-
currency price of foreign currency) and 
	
 the foreign-currency value of
foreign assets. Domestic government bonds are held only at home.
The household enters period  with 	
1 holdings of cash balances. It
also collects principal plus interest on bank deposits at the rate contracted
in    1, 
1, principal and interest payments on maturing domestic and
foreign government bonds, at rates 
1 and 
	
1 respectively, and principal
and interest payments on bank debt, at rate 
1.
At the beginning of the period, the household chooses the levels of cash,
deposits, bank debt, the amounts of domestic and foreign bonds, and labor
supply to IG producers, for which it receives factor payments of 
,w h e r e
 =  
 is the economy-wide real wage (with  denoting the nominal
wage), measured in terms of the price of  nal goods sold domestically. At the





the CG producer, 
 ,a n dt h eb a n k ,
 , which is (as noted earlier) liquidated
at the end of the period.13 It also pays a lump-sum tax, whose real value is
. The household then adjusts its demand for housing.
13The FG  rm makes zero pro ts.
9The household’s end-of-period budget constraint is thus
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where the last term represents transactions costs associated with changes in
holdings of bank debt, with    0 denoting an adjustment cost parameter.14
For simplicity, we assume that housing does not depreciate.









 is the risk-free world interest rate and 
	














0  0. As discussed at length in Agénor (1997, 1998, 2006) this
speci cation re ects the view that the household is able to lend (borrow,
with 
	
  0) more on world capital markets only at a lower (higher) rate
of interest; the latter captures the existence of individual default risk.15
Our treatment di ers substantially from the “country risk” speci cation
proposed by Benigno (2009) and often adopted in the open-economy New
Keynesian literature; see, for instance, Lindé et al. (2009). In our speci ca-
tion, as in Benigno’s, the premium is symmetric; households receive a lower
(pay a higher) rate on their international savings (foreign debt). However,
with country risk, the spread depends (positively) on the country’s net for-
eign debt, or (negatively) on the economy’s net foreign assets, de ned as

  = !
 + 
	
   "

 ,w h e r e!
 denotes central bank reserves and
"

 bank borrowing. In our speci cation, 
	
 depends only on individual
assets, 
	
 ; in contrast with models of “pure” country risk, our formula-
tion implies that the representative household internalizes the e ect of its
borrowing decisions on 
	
 , as discussed next.
14As in Markovic (2006) for instance, the adjustment cost is taken to be a deadweight
loss for society.
15A more general speci cation would be to specify the risk premium as a convex curve,
with a binding constraint when 

 is su ciently high. However, this does not make
much di erence here, given that the model is log-linearized before solving it.
10The risk-free world interest rate follows a  rst-order autoregressive process:
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and .L e t1+&
+1 = 
+1
 and let ' denote the shadow price associated
with constraint (4), that is, the marginal value of wealth. Maximizing (1)
subject to (2)-(6) yields the following  rst-order conditions
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These conditions are familiar except for (11), (12), and (14). Equation




































which shows that the demand for bank debt depends positively on its rate
of return and negatively on the domestic bond rate.
Equation (14) is an arbitrage condition, which equates the expected mar-
ginal rates of return on domestic and foreign assets under the assumption of
imperfect world capital markets. It re ects the fact that the marginal rate
of return on foreign bonds falls with a marginal increase in 
	
 . Condition









0 (1 + 
 )E(+1)
 (17)
which shows that the optimal level of household holdings of foreign bonds
is a function of the di erence between the expected, depreciation-adjusted
world safe interest rate and the domestic bond rate. Perfect capital mobil-
ity prevails when 
	
0   0, in which case 1+
 =( 1+
 )E(+1),
corresponding to the standard uncovered interest parity condition.
2.2 Domestic Final Good
The  nal-good producer imports a continuum of di erentiated intermediate
goods directly (without incurring distribution costs) from the rest of the
world and combines them with a similar continuum of domestically-produced
intermediate goods, to generate a domestic  nal good, which is sold both
domestically (for consumption and investment) and abroad. The good is
produced in quantity ) using a CES technology:
) =[   ()

 )





where     (01), ) 
 () 
 ) a quantity index of domestic (imported) inter-
mediate goods, and 	 1 is the elasticity of substitution between baskets












 =   (19)
12where   1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate domestic
goods among themselves ( = ), and imported goods among themselves
( =  ), and ) 
 is the quantity of type- intermediate good of category 
(domestic or imported).
The FG producer sells its output at a perfectly competitive price. Let

 denote the price of domestic intermediate good  set by  rm ,a n d

 the price of imported intermediate good , in domestic currency. Cost
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where 
 and 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Aggregating across  rms yields the allocation of total demand between



















where  is the implicit  nal output de ator (or  nal producer price), given
by











To allow for imperfect exchange rate pass-through of import prices, we
assume local currency price stickiness. Speci cally, the domestic-currency
price of imports of intermediate good  is taken to be determined through a













 is the foreign-currency price of good ,a n d*   (01) measures
the speed of adjustment of the domestic-currency price of imports to its
“normal” value, 
; there is complete pass-through (that is, producer
16Combining equations (22) yields  
  
 =[   (1    )](
 
 ).
13currency pricing) if and only if * =1 .17 In general, the domestic-currency
price of imports will re ect only partially current  uctuations of the nominal
exchange rate.
To model the allocation of production of the  nal good between sales on
the domestic market, ) 
 , and exports, ) 
 , we assume that the volume sold
abroad depends only the the domestic-currency price of exports of the  nal
good, 












where    1 is the elasticity of transformation.







 is the world price. Thus, exports are priced in the importers’
currency, in line with the evidence for many developing countries.
The volume of goods sold on the domestic market is given by
)

 = )   )

 ( (27)
2.3 Domestic Intermediate Goods
There is a continuum of IG producers, indexed by    (01). Each  rm pro-
ducing domestic intermediate goods combines labor and capital to produce










17Alternatively, to account for imperfect exchange rate pass-through, we could introduce
a monopolistically competitive import goods sector and assume that domestic prices of
imported intermediate goods are sticky à la Calvo-Rotemberg. See for instance Smets
and Wouters (2002), Lindé et al. (2004), Caputo et al. (2006), Adolfson et al. (2007),
Senay (2008), Pavasuthipaisit (2010), and Shi and Xu (2010). Our assumption is that all
importers follow a backward-looking pricing rule. This simpli es matters, given the focus
of this study.
18Thus, exports are (indirectly) produced by using imported goods in addition to
domestically-produced intermediate goods; see Christiano et al. (2007) for an alterna-
tive approach. Note also that we abstract from external demand factors.
14where 
 is the supply of labor by the representative household to  rm 
and ,   (01).
At the beginning of the period, each IG producer rents capital from the
CG producer, at the rate -
 , measured in terms of the price of intermediate
goods. Capital rent is paid at the end of the period; however, wages must be
paid in advance. To do so  rm  borrows the amount "
 from the bank.19
The amount borrowed is therefore such that
"





Loans contracted for the purpose of  nancing working capital (which are
short-term in nature) do not carry any risk, and are therefore made at a rate
that re ects only the cost of borrowing from the central bank, 
 ,w h i c hw e
refer to as the re nance rate. Repayment of all loans occurs at the end of
the period.
With (29) holding with equality, total costs of  rm  in period ,  ,
are given by










IG producers are competitive in factor markets. In standard fashion, cost
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,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As in Rotemberg (1982), domestic IG producers incur a cost in adjusting
prices, of the form (/2)[
(˜ &
1)   1]2) 
 ,w h e r e/   0 is the
adjustment cost parameter (or, equivalently, the degree of price stickiness)
and ˜ & =1+˜ & is the gross steady-state in ation rate in the price of
19Firms do not have direct access to credit from foreign lenders, they borrow only from
the domestic bank. This assumption is consistent with the evidence, which shows that
 rms in developing countries (except for the very large ones) depend predominantly on
domestic banks for most of their credit needs.
15domestic goods. Each  rm  chooses a sequence of prices so as to maximize








































=0 as given, the  rst-order condition for this
maximization problem is:


















































which determines the adjustment process of the nominal price 
.
2.4 Production of Capital
At the beginning of the period, the CG producer buys an amount 0 of the
 nal good from the FG producer and combines it with the existing capital
stock to produce new capital goods that will be used in the next period,
++1. The existing capital stock is then rented to IG producers, at the rate
-
 . Aggregate capital accumulates as follows:
++1 = 0 +( 1  1)+  
 
2
(++1   +)2
+
 (35)
20In standard fashion, IG  rms (which are owned by households) are assumed to value




0 +, 1   (01) is a constant rate of depreciation, and    0
is a parameter that measures the magnitude of adjustment costs.
Investment goods must be paid in advance; the CG producer must there-






At the end of the period, loans are repaid in full, with interest. Thus, the
total (interest-inclusive) cost of buying  nal goods for investment purposes
is given by (1 + 
 )
 0,w h e r e
 is the lending rate.
The CG producer chooses the level of investment (taking the rental rate,
the lending rate, the price of the  nal good, and the existing capital stock,
as given) so as to maximize the value of the discounted stream of dividend














+ denotes nominal pro ts at the end of period  + 2 (or beginning















































At the beginning of each period , the bank receives deposits  from the
household. Funds are used for loans to the CG producer and IG producers,
21Again, the CG producer is assumed to value future pro ts according to the household’s
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption.
17which use them to buy goods for investment purposes and pay for labor in


















 is aggregate demand for labor by IG producers.
The maturity period of loans to intermediate  rms coincides with the
maturity period of household deposits. Upon receiving these deposits, and
given its capital requirements (which determines how much debt it issues, ),
total loans, ", and its foreign borrowing, "

 , the bank borrows from the
central bank, "
 
 , to fund any shortfall. At the end of the period, it repays
the central bank, at the interest rate, 
 . It also holds required reserves at
the central bank, !!.22
The bank’s balance sheet is thus
" + !! =  + "











 denoting capital requirements and  !
 excess capital.




where *   (01) is the reserve requirement ratio.
Let 
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 is again the risk-free world interest rate and 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22The bank holds no domestic bonds. As discussed in the next section, in equilibrium
it has no incentive to do so.
18where 

0  0. Thus, the premium that the bank faces on world capital
markets depends on how much it borrows.23






where #   (01) is the “overall” capital ratio (de ned later) and % the risk
weight. In line with the “foundation” variant of the Internal Ratings Based
(IRB) approach of Basel II (which remains essentially the same under Basel







where /#  0. Thus, in the steady state, the risk weight is normalized to
unity.
The bank sets the deposit and lending rates, issues capital (in the form
of one-period debt) to satisfy prudential rules, and determines foreign bor-
rowing and excess capital so as to maximize the present discounted value
of its pro ts, while internalizing the e ect of its borrowing decisions on the
risk premium that it faces on world capital markets. Because the bank is
liquidated and debt is redeemed at the end of each period, this maximization
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23Alternatively, the premium could be speci ed as a function of the ratio of foreign
borrowing to bank capital, 

 . In practice, many middle-income countries impose
maximum limits on a bank’s foreign currency liabilities in terms of its core capital or net
worth.
24See Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Silva (2009) for a detailed discussion of this spec-
i cation. Alternatively, under the Standardized Approach,  could be taken to be a
function of the output gap, if ratings are assumed to be procyclical.






















where 4   (01), 5, 5, 5  0, 5   0, /!   (01),a n d3   (01) is
the repayment probability of the CG producer, and ¯  the exogenous stock
of housing, which produces a proportional supply of services.25 The third





expected repayment on loans to the CG producer if there is no default. The
fourth term represents what the bank expects to earn in case of default, that
is, “e ective” collateral, given by a fraction 4   (01) of “raw” collateral,
which consists of the marked-to-market value of the housing stock.
The  fth term, *, represents the reserve requirements held at the
central bank and returned to the bank at the end of the period (prior to
its closure). The term (1 + 
 ) represents the value of deposits (principal
and interest) by the bank. The term (1 + 
 )
1
  represents the value







 is the domestic-currency value of the bank’s repayment on
foreign loans.
The linear term 5
1
  captures the cost associated with issuing bank





 )",c a p t u r e st h ev i e w ,d i s -
cussed in Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Silva (2009, 2011), that maintaining
a positive capital bu er generates bene ts–it signals that the bank’s  nan-
cial position is strong, and reduces the intensity of regulatory scrutiny.















































25The expectation E is taken with respect to an implicit idiosyncratic shock to output
of capital goods, which is unknown at the time the bank makes its pricing decisions.
20where 	 is the interest elasticity of the supply of deposits to the deposit rate
and 	 the interest elasticity of the CG demand for loans (or investment) to
the lending rate.
Equation (49) shows that the equilibrium deposit rate is a markup over
the re nance rate, adjusted (downward) for the implicit cost of holding re-
serve requirements. Equation (50) indicates that the lending rate depends
negatively on the repayment probability, and positively on a weighted aver-
age of the marginal cost of borrowing from the central bank and the total
cost of issuing debt for capital requirement purposes. Equation (51) states
that foreign borrowing is decreasing in the cost of borrowing abroad and in-
creasing in the cost of borrowing domestically from the central bank; there
is no borrowing if the former increases the latter. Equation (52) shows that
an increase in the direct or indirect cost of issuing debt (
 or 5) reduces
excess capital, whereas an increase in 5 raises excess capital.
As in Agénor, Alper, and Pereira (2009, 2010), and given the focus of this
study, we adopt a reduced-form approach to model the repayment probabil-
ity.26 Speci cally, 3 is taken to depend positively on the e ective collateral-
CG loan ratio (which mitigates moral hazard on the part of borrowers) and











with 717 2  0 and 6
 = )¯ ) is the output gap, with ¯ ) the frictionless
level of aggregate output (that is, the level corresponding to  =0 ).27 We
also abstract from the “monitoring incentive e ect” associated with bank
capital, as discussed in Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Silva (2010, 2011),
given that it plays no substantive role in the present analysis.
Figure 1 summarizes the links between bank capital, the repayment prob-
ability, and the loan rate in the model.
26Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) also use a quasi-reduced form to de ne bank spreads.
27In Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2011), the repayment probability is endogenously
determined as part of the bank’s optimization process. Speci cally, they assume that the
bank can a ect the repayment probability on its loans by expending e ort on selecting
(ex ante) its borrowers; the higher the e ort, the safer the loan. Assuming that the cost
of screening depends (inversely) not only on the collateral-investment loan ratio but also
on the cyclical position of the economy and the capital-loan ratio yields a speci cation
similar to (53).
21The balance sheet constraint (40), together with (42), can be used to
determine residually borrowing from the central bank:
"
 
 = "   "

   (1   *
)   ( (54)
Finally, at the end of the period, the bank pays interest on deposits, and
repays with interest loans received from the central bank and the debt that
it issued. Because the bank closes down, there are no retained earnings; all
pro ts are rebated lump-sum to the household.
2.6 Central Bank
The central bank’s assets consists of international reserves, !
 , holdings of
government bonds,  
 , and loans to commercial banks, "
 
 . Its liabilities
consists of cash  and required reserves !!. The balance sheet of the







 =  + !!( (55)
Although the exchange rate is  exible, we assume that, as a result of a
self-insurance motive against volatile capital  ows, or a desire to stabilize the
exchange rate, the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to
adjust the actual foreign-currency value of its reserves so as to achieve a
desired value !
%
 , speci ed as a weighted average of shares of imports of
intermediate goods and foreign liabilities of the private sector, "



























2  0. Thus, in the particular case where 7 =0
and /

2 =1 , the central bank’s objective is to maintain a zero stock of net
foreign assets.












where 7   (01) is the speed of adjustment.









   *
( (58)
22Any income made by the central bank on its foreign reserves and from its
loans to the commercial bank is transferred to the government at the end of
each period. The e ect of exchange rate  uctuations, however, are taken to
be o -balance-sheet items.
The central bank sets its base policy rate, 













 +93 ln]+: (59)
where ˜ - is the steady-state value of the real interest rate on bonds, &%   0
the central bank’s headline in ation target, 8   (01) a coe cient measuring
the degree of interest rate smoothing, and 919 29 3  0,a n dln: is a serially
uncorrelated random shock with zero mean. Thus, in addition to targeting
in ation, the central bank also “leans against the wind” by raising (lowering)
the policy rate when the nominal exchange rate depreciates (appreciates). We
will consider subsequently an alternative speci cation, in which the central
bank responds to  uctuations in the real exchange rate.
The overall capital ratio set by the central bank-cum-regulator consists

















˜ ;)   1 (61)
where 
   0. Thus, the macroprudential rule calls for a tightening of capital
requirements when real credit exceeds beyond its steady-state value. This
speci cation captures, in our view, the main idea behind the countercyclical
capital bu er rule envisaged under Basel III Basel (see Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (2010))–with the di erence that here we do not impose any
constraint on the range of values that # 
 can take.
2.7 Government
The government purchases the  nal good and issues nominal riskless one-
period bonds to  nance its de cit; it does not borrow abroad. Its budget



















where  =  
 + 	
 is the outstanding stock of government bonds, <
real government spending, and  real lump-sum tax revenues. The last two
terms represent the interest income transferred by the central bank to the
government.
Government purchases represent a fraction =   (01) of domestic sales of





In a symmetric equilibrium,  rms producing intermediate goods are identical.
Thus, + = +, 
 = 
, ) = ), 
 = 
 , for all    (01).A l l  r m s
also produce the same output and prices are the same across  rms. In the
steady state, in ation is constant at ˜ &.
Equilibrium in the goods markets requires that sales on the domestic
market be equal to aggregate demand, inclusive of price adjustment costs:
)

 =  + < + 0 +
 
2
(++1   +)2
+
 (64)











Suppose that bank loans to IG  rms and the capital producer are made
only in the form of cash, and let !
 denote total cash holdings by these
agents; thus, " = !






 + " (66)
where 
 is de ned in (58). Using (54) as well for "
 
 implies that the
equilibrium condition (66) can be rewritten as

	




   "

 )    (67)
which, after substituting (9) and (10) for 	
 and , can be solved for the
equilibrium bond rate.
24The government is assumed to balance its budget by adjusting lump-sum
taxes, while keeping the overall stock of bonds constant at ¯ , and that the
central bank also keeps its stock of bonds constant at ¯  . Private holdings
of domestic government bonds are thus equal to 	 = ¯    ¯  .
Finally, the external budget constraint of the economy (or equivalently
the equilibrium condition of the market for foreign exchange), measured in
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  =0 
where 
  is the net foreign asset position of the economy, de ned as









The steady-state solution of the model is derived in Appendix A. Several of
its key features are similar to those of the closed-economy models described
in Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Silva (2009, 2011), so we refer to those
papers for a more detailed discussion.
In brief, with a headline in ation target &% equal to zero, the steady-
state in ation rate ˜ & is also zero. In addition to standard results (the steady-
state value of the marginal cost, for instance, is given by (   1)), the
steady-state value of the repayment probability is
˜ 3 =(
4 ˜  ¯ 
˜ " )
$1
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28Under a  xed exchange rate, 	 = ¯ 	 and condition (68) determines changes in o cial
reserves, 

 . Equation (57) is thus dropped from the system. Under a  exible exchange













From these equations it can be shown that ˜ >  ˜ >.W ea l s oh a v e ˜ > 
˜ > for    0 (because holding bank debt is subject to a cost), and thus
˜ >  ˜ >. Equation (52) determines ˜  !, which is positive given that ˜ >  ˜ >.
From (46), ˜ % =1(by construction) and from (45), the steady-state required
capital-risky assets ratio, ˜  ˜ ",i se q u a lt o#.
To analyze the response of the economy to shocks, we log-linearize the
model around a nonstochastic, zero-in ation steady state. The log-linearized
equations are summarized in Appendix B.
5 Illustrative Calibration
To calibrate the model we dwell extensively on Agénor and Alper (2009)
and Agénor, Alper and Pereira da Silva (2009, 2011). We therefore refer to
those studies for a detailed discussion of some of our choices. In addition, for
some of the parameters that are “new” or speci c to this study, we consider
alternative values in sensitivity tests. This is the case, in particular, for the
degree of exchange rate pass-through, the weight attached to net private
sector foreign liabilities in the reserve accumulation equation, the coe cient
of the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation in the monetary policy rule,
and the sensitivity of countercyclical bank capital to credit gaps.
Parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The discount factor  is set
at 0(985, which corresponds to an annual real interest rate of 6 percent. The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ,i s0(6, in line with estimates for
middle-income countries (see Agénor and Montiel (2008)). The preference
parameter for leisure, 	,i ss e ta t4(5. This value is consistent with a share
of time allocated to market work equal to 0(33 (corresponding to 8 hours
a day). The preference parameters for composite monetary assets, 	,a n d
housing, 	, are set at the same low value, 0(02. The share parameter in the
index of money holdings, , which corresponds to the relative share of cash
in narrow money, is set at 0(35.
The distribution parameter between domestic and imported intermedi-
ated goods in the production of the  nal good,  , is set at 0(7,w h e r e a s
	, the elasticity of substitution between baskets of domestic and imported
composite intermediate goods, is set at 0(8. The  rst parameter, which can
26be approximated in practice by the share of nontraded goods in total GDP,
re ects the fact that we consider an economy that is still relatively closed
(e.g., Brazil). The elasticities of substitution between intermediate domestic
goods among themselves, , and imported goods among themselves,  are
set equal at 10. The pass-through elasticity is set at * =0 (3; this is line
with the average value estimated by Soto and Selaive (2003) for instance, for
a group of 35 countries, and consistent with the recent evidence suggesting
a decline in the strength of the pass-through e ect in both industrial and
developing countries. The price elasticity of exports,  , is set equal to 0(7,a
value consistent with a range of estimates for middle-income countries.
The share of capital in domestic output of intermediate goods, ,, is set at
0(35.W i t h =1 0 , the steady-state value of the markup rate, ( 1),i s
equal to 11(1 percent. The adjustment cost parameter for prices of domestic
intermediate goods, /,i ss e ta t74(5. The rate of depreciation of private
capital, 1, is set equal to 0(03, corresponding to an annual rate of 4 percent.
The adjustment cost for transforming the  nal good into investment,  ,i s
set at 14.
For the parameters characterizing bank behavior, we assume that the
e ective collateral-loan ratio, 4,i s0(2. The adjustment cost parameter for
holdings of bank debt,  , is set at 1(0, to capture relatively ine cient
markets. The elasticity of the repayment probability is set at 71 =0 (03
with respect to collateral and 72 =1 (5 with respect to the output gap. The
elasticity of the risk weight with respect to the repayment probability is set
at 7# =1 (25. The cost parameters 5 and 5 are also set at low values,
0(18,a n d0(001, respectively. The parameter /!, which captures the bene t
associated with capital bu ers, is set to 0(5. Given the speci cation of the risk
weight % in (46), its steady-state value is equal to unity. The deterministic
component of the capital adequacy ratio, #–and thus the overall capital
ratio, given that #  =0in the steady-state–is set at 0(08, which corresponds
to the minimum value of the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets under
Pillar 1 of Basel II. We also calibrate the excess capital-risky assets ratio
to be equal to 0(04. This implies that the steady-state ratio of total bank
capital to risky loans is set at about 12 percent (so that ˜  !˜   =0 (53),
in line with the evidence reported in Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2012).
Our calibration implies a total (corporate) credit-to-output ratio of about 60
percent, which is consistent with data for several middle-income countries.
Parameter 

0 , which determines how the bank’s foreign borrowing responds
to the di erential in the cost of domestic and foreign borrowing, is set at
270(16; this number implies that bank foreign liabilities represent about 10
percent (a reasonable number for many middle-income countries) of their
total liabilities. In order to focus the analysis on capital  ows associated
with bank foreign borrowing, we assume zero net holdings of foreign bonds
by households.29
The reserve requirement rate * is set at 0(1. We abstract from persis-
tence stemming from the central bank’s policy response and set the smooth-
ing parameter 8 =0 . We also set 91 =2 (5 and 92 =0 (2, which are conven-
tional values for Taylor-type rules for middle-income countries; the value of
92, in particular, is consistent with the evidence reported for Chile by Ca-
puto et al. (2006) and for several countries in Latin America by Moura and
Carvalho (2010). We initially assume that the central bank does not respond
to  uctuations in the nominal exchange rate, and set therefore 93 =0 .W e
also assume initially that the central bank’s foreign reserve target is set only
in terms of trade considerations, so 7 =1 ,a n dw es e t/

1 =2 ,t oc a p t u r e
the view that the central bank targets a stock of reserves equal to 6 months
of (intermediate) imports. The speed of adjustment of actual reserves to its
target level, 7, is set at 0(2. The parameter characterizing the countercycli-
cal regulatory rule, 
 , is initially set at 0. Finally, the degree of persistence
of the shock to the world risk-free rate, #,i ss e ta t0(8, which implies a
reasonably high degree of inertia.
6 Dynamics of a Sudden Flood
To illustrate the properties of the model in response to external shocks, we
consider as a base experiment (with 
  =0 ) a temporary, one-period only,
drop in the world risk-free interest rate by 35 basis points at a quarterly rate,
or about 141 basis points at an annual rate.30 The magnitude of the shock
is thus large enough to illustrate the thrust of the analysis.
The results are summarized in Figure 2, for 20 of the key variables. The
immediate e ect of the shock is to lower the cost of borrowing abroad for
the domestic bank. The bank’s foreign liabilities therefore increase, with a
matching in ow of capital, which leads to an appreciation of the nominal
29As a result, we do not  x a value for the parameter 

0 .
30See Ma´ ckowiak (2007) for evidence on the impact of monetary shocks in the United
States on a group of middle-income countries in East Asia and Latin America, as well as
Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
28exchange rate. In turn, the nominal appreciation lowers the domestic price
of imported intermediate goods and stimulates production, while at the same
time raising the central bank’s desired level–and thus the actual stock, given
partial adjustment–of foreign reserves. In turn, the accumulation of foreign
reserves tends to increase the monetary base.31 At the same time, the increase
in foreign borrowing by the commercial bank reduces its domestic borrowing
from the central bank, which tends to reduce the monetary base. The former
e ect dominates, implying an increase in the supply of cash. At the initial
level of consumption, the nominal bond rate must therefore fall to increase
the demand for cash and restore equilibrium in the currency market. At the
same time, the expected future increase in in ation means that the real bond
rate also falls; this induces households to increase consumption today.
In addition to an intertemporal e ect on consumption, the fall in the real
bond rate also leads to an increase in the demand for housing, which tends
to raise real estate prices. This raises the value of collateral that  rms can
pledge. Because the real loan rate falls initially, the demand for investment
loans increases–so much so that the collateral-loan ratio falls, thereby re-
ducing the repayment probability. But because the output gap increases, the
net e ect on the probability of repayment is positive. The nominal loan rate
therefore falls. This e ect is compounded by the drop in the policy rate,
which re ects an initial drop in in ation (measured in terms of the price of
domestic sales), itself related to the fact that the nominal appreciation tends
to lower the domestic-currency price of imported intermediate goods. Thus,
aggregate demand (spending on the goods sold domestically) unambiguously
increases on impact. In addition to the level e ect on  nal output, there is
also a composition e ect: the appreciation of the nominal and real exchange
rates translates into a drop in the share of domestic production allocated to
exports, and an increase in the share of production sold domestically.
Over time, the increase in investment raises the capital stock, which tends
to lower the rental rate of capital and to raise the marginal product of la-
bor and therefore gross wages. The increase in current consumption raises
the marginal utility of leisure and induces households to reduce their supply
of labor, thereby magnifying the initial upward pressure on real wages re-
sulting from the increased demand for labor associated with higher output.
31Because both the reserve target and bank foreign borrowing increase, the net foreign
asset position of the economy is in general ambiguous. Given our calibration, it deterio-
rates, implying that the latter e ect dominates the former.
29However, the downward movement in the policy rate (the rate at which in-
termediate goods producers borrow to  nance their working capital needs)
is large enough to ensure that the e ective wage rate falls. Indeed, as noted
earlier, the initial fall in domestic in ation tends to lower immediately the
policy rate–despite the expansion in output. Because the rental rate of
capital does not change on impact (due to the one-period lag in capital accu-
mulation), marginal costs unambiguously fall in the  rst period. This tends
to compound the downward e ect on in ation (in terms of the price of goods
sold on the domestic market) resulting from the exchange rate appreciation,
and thus the drop in the policy and loan rates. Over time, the reduction in
the rental rate of capital induced by the boom in investment leads in a  rst
phase to lower marginal costs, but the increase in the e ective wage leads to
higher in ation in terms of domestic prices.
The fall in the bond rate tends to increase household demand for bank
capital, thereby exerting downward pressure on the rate of return on bank
debt. At the same time, there are two opposing forces on the supply of bank
capital. On the one hand, the increase in (risky) investment loans increases
capital requirements; on the other, the increase in the repayment probability
lowers the risk weight attached to investment loans, which tends (together
with an initial fall in prices) to lower capital requirements. The latter dom-
inates and, as shown in Figure 2, the net e ect is an increase in required
capital, which tends to increase the rate of return on bank capital. The net
e ect on the latter is thus in general ambiguous. In the case shown in the
 gure, the rate of return on bank capital falls.32 In turn, the reduction in the
cost at which the bank issues capital magni es the initial downward impact
on the lending rate. The regulatory regime is thus procyclical. Finally, the
gradual increase in the policy rate (the marginal cost of domestic borrowing
for the bank) explains why foreign borrowing continues to increase beyond
the  rst period and falls only very gradually afterward (keeping the external
risk premium high in the process), despite the fact that the drop in the world
risk-free rate is only temporary.33
It is worth noting that because  rms do not borrow directly abroad, the
type of balance sheet e ects often discussed in the literature on devaluations
and  nancial crises (see Agénor and Montiel (2008)) are not present. The
32The policy rate drops by about the same amount as the cost of bank capital, implying
that the net e ect on excess bank capital is relatively small.
33Of course, the fact that the shock to the world risk-free rate is assumed to show some
persistence matters as well.
30balance sheet e ect, in this model, operates through changes in commercial
bank liabilities: higher foreign borrowing feeds into the risk premium that
the bank faces on world capital markets and falls only slowly over time;
as a result, the premium-inclusive cost of foreign borrowing (as de ned in
equation (44)) falls, but by less than the risk-free rate. Put di erently, the
fact that imperfections on world capital markets are internalized actually
mitigate incentives to borrow abroad; they therefore play a stabilizing role.
The results of this experiment illustrate fairly well the fact that a “sudden
 ood” of foreign capital, induced by a drop in the risk-free rate of return on
external assets, may generate a domestic boom characterized by increases
in asset prices and aggregate demand, an expansion in output and (over
time) in ationary pressures–despite the fact that the nominal appreciation
that accompanies these in ows may mitigate somewhat the initial impact
on in ation, and the fact that higher bank borrowing abroad does not lead
directly to higher credit, as in some models where credit is supply-driven.
Indeed, at the initial levels of credit and deposits, higher bank borrowing
abroad leads simply to less borrowing from the central bank. In turn, this
a ects the determination of the bond rate (through the equilibrium condition
of the currency market), consumption, housing demand, and collateral values,
which in turn feed into the repayment probability, the loan rate and the
policy rate–thereby promoting investment.34 The expansionary mechanism
is therefore indirect and depends crucially on bank pricing behavior.
At the same time, the analysis shows that the regulatory regime matters
in the transmission of external shocks. Movements in the repayment prob-
ability feeds into changes in risk weights, which in turn a ect the cost of
issuing capital and bank pricing decisions. Given our calibration, this feed-
back e ect helps to magnify the initial shock; the regulatory regime is thus
procyclical.35 Put di erently, in addition to the stance of monetary policy
(which in the present case includes not only the interest rate rule but also the
reserve accumulation rule), the nature of the regulatory regime also matters
in assessing the dynamics of sudden  oods in foreign capital.
34With liquidity-constrained consumers, as for instance in Agénor et al. (2011), the
expansion in consumption would be larger than recorded in this experiment.
35Note also that the Basel II-type regulatory regime that we consider is (because of the
endogeneity of the risk weight) more procyclical than a Basel I-type regime with a  xed
risk weight, due to its direct link with the repayment probability. This is consistent with
the conventional view, although we have discussed elsewhere a counterintuitive case (see
Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Siva (2010)).
317 Sensitivity Analysis
To assess the sensitivity of the previous results, we consider several additional
experiments: an increase in the degree of exchange rate pass-through, a
greater weight attached to net private sector foreign liabilities in the reserve
accumulation equation, and a monetary policy that “leans against the wind”
by responding to changes in the nominal exchange rate. We will consider in
the next section an additional sensitivity test, which involves giving a role to
countercyclical capital regulation.
7.1 Degree of Exchange-Rate Pass-through
We  rst consider an increase in the degree of exchange rate pass-through of
nominal exchange rate changes to the domestic-currency price of imported
intermediate goods, *,f r o m0(3 to 0(7. The results of this experiment are
shown in Figure 3, together with the baseline results. On impact, a higher
pass-through rate magni es slightly the downward e ect of the initial nomi-
nal appreciation on the domestic-currency price of imports induced by capital
in ows. As a result, the shift in demand toward imported intermediate goods
is larger. This tends to magnify the increase in the desired and actual re-
serve levels, which in turn tends to expand the monetary base. However,
the appreciation induces the bank to borrow more on world capital markets;
this reduces its borrowing from the central bank, which tends to contract
the monetary base. Because the former e ect dominates, the supply of cash
increases by more, and the nominal bond rate must fall by more to restore
equilibrium in the currency market. Because initially prices do not change
much, the bond rate falls by more, inducing households to increase consump-
tion today by more as well. As a result, output expands by more, thereby
inducing a larger increase in the repayment probability (a fall in the risk pre-
mium) and a larger positive e ect on investment. Marginal costs fall by more
because of the larger drop in the policy rate. The initial drop in in ation
(measured in terms of the price of goods sold domestically) is thus larger.
Thus, a higher pass-through rate magni es the domestic e ects of the shock
and creates more volatility.
327.2 Speed of Adjustment to Foreign Reserve Target
We now consider an increase in the speed of adjustment of foreign-currency
reserves to their target level, 7, from the initial value 0(2 to 0(7. The results
of this experiment are shown in Figure 4. Because bank foreign borrowing
increases signi cantly initially, the assumption that the central bank adjusts
its desired level of reserves to its target value at a faster rate implies its net
foreign assets increase by more in the initial periods. The increase in the
desired and actual reserve levels tend to expand the monetary base by more.
The larger increase in money supply requires a smaller drop in the nominal
bond rate to restore equilibrium on the currency market. Consequently, the
real bond rate increases by less, dampening the shift in household consump-
tion across periods and mitigating the initial boom in private expenditure.
As a result, output expands by less. The drop in the loan rate is also damp-
ened, implying that investment expands by less. Marginal costs tend to fall
by less initially because the upward pressure on wages is now weaker and the
central bank eases its policy stance. The initial increase in in ation is thus
dampened.
7.3 Response to Exchange Rate Movements
Finally, we consider an increase in the parameter that captures the extent to
which the central bank responds to nominal depreciation in setting its policy
rate, 93,f r o m0 to 0(5. This value is quite large compared to some of the
estimates in the literature for middle-income countries; Caputo et al. (2006),
for instance, estimated a value of about 0(15 for Chile.
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 5. Because the nom-
inal exchange rate appreciates on impact, the direct implication is that the
re nance rate falls by more than before. This, naturally enough, smoothes
out the path of the exchange rate. But the drop in the loan rate (initially re-
lated to the drop in the risk premium) is now larger, and the initial expansion
in investment is magni ed. Because the nominal exchange rate is expected
to depreciate by a bit more, the increase in bank foreign borrowing is less
marked, implying now (based on the reasoning outlined earlier) a larger drop
in the nominal bond rate. As a result, consumption today increases by more
initially. Because this also raises the marginal utility of leisure by more, the
drop in labor supply is magni ed, implying that the initial upward pressure
on real wages is larger. As a result, the initial rise in the e ective cost of
33labor (and thus marginal costs) is now more signi cant, despite the larger
drop in the cost of short-term borrowing. By and large, attempts to miti-
gate exchange rate movements through changes in the policy rate create a
trade-o : the nominal exchange rate is less volatile, but most other variables
are more volatile.
8 Countercyclical Regulation
As discussed in the introduction, a dilemma that policymakers in middle-
income countries have faced in recent years is related to the that, if a central
bank responds to a sudden  ood in foreign capital by raising interest rates
to counter in ationary pressures, it runs the risk of exacerbating in ows
(because banks would borrow more abroad), which in turn would translate
into more lending, higher domestic demand, and possibly higher in ation–
despite the bene t of nominal appreciation on the domestic-currency price
of imported goods. The question then is whether, in such conditions, other
instruments can help to maintain economic stability. Speci cally, we now
turn to an examination of the potential role of countercyclical bank capital
regulation in response to sudden  oods. We begin by considering how a coun-
tercyclical regulatory rule a ects the transmission process; we then consider
how it a ects economic instability. We do so while keeping the interest rate
rule as in the base experiment, that is, without response to exchange rate
depreciation.
Consider an increase in the parameter characterizing the countercyclical
regulatory rule, 
  in (61), from an initial value of 0 to 5. The outcome of this
experiment is shown in Figure 6. In line with the results in Agénor, Alper,
and Pereira da Silva (2011), despite inducing higher volatility in bank capital,
the presence of the rule mitigates the boom. As noted earlier, the initial
expansion in output and the increase in housing prices that accompanies the
shock to the world risk-free rate tend to raise the repayment probability,
which reduces the lending rate and stimulates borrowing for investment.
The countercyclical rule, by imposing higher capital requirements, miti-
gates the initial drop in the cost of issuing debt by the bank, thereby damp-
ening the initial expansionary e ect on the loan rate associated with higher
collateral values. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the cost of bank capital drops
by much less than in the baseline case. Although bank capital is naturally
more volatile, the loan rate and investment are less volatile. In that sense,
34therefore, the policy works as intended.
However, the  gure also shows that the policy rate drops by more than in
the baseline experiment, and that consumption and real house prices increase
by more as well. Intuitively, these results can be explained as follows. In the
absence of the countercyclical regulatory rule, investment responds quite sig-
ni cantly to a change in the policy rate, through its e ect on the loan rate.
Thus, as aggregate demand (consumption and investment) responds rela-
tively strongly to the policy rate, changes in that variable induced by any
given in ation-inducing shock would not need to be very large. However, in
the presence of a regulatory rule, and to the extent that the shock requires a
higher capital adequacy ratio, the link between the policy rate and the loan
rate is weakened. The reason is that the higher capital adequacy ratio raises
the weight attached to the cost of issuing bank capital in the price-setting
equation for the loan rate. As a result, investment (and therefore aggregate
demand) becomes less reactive to changes in the policy rate–which would
need now to react more signi cantly to an in ationary shock, and induc-
ing in the process a larger response in consumption.36 Indeed, in the case
considered here, with the initial appreciation translating into lower in ation,
the presence of the countercyclical regulatory rule implies that the policy
rate needs to decline by more than otherwise, and this eventually leads to a
larger increase in consumption. The reason is that with a larger drop in the
policy (and deposit) rate, and by implication lower bank deposits, borrowing
from the central bank increases, and this would bring a larger increase in the
supply of cash–requiring therefore a larger drop in the bond rate to equili-
brate the currency market. This, in turn, would induce households to spend
more today. By implication, the demand for housing services, and real house
prices, would also increase. The rise in house prices (through its value on
the value of collateral) magni es the increase in the repayment probability,
thereby compounding the downward e ect on the loan rate and o setting
somewhat the bene t associated with the countercyclical rule. The impor-
tant point, however, is that the countercyclical regulatory rule, while making
the loan rate and investment less volatile, may be associated not only with
36In principle for this e ect to operate what is needed is an increase in , not only
an increase in . For the shock considered here, this is indeed the case, even though 
falls. Note also that, the endogeneity of  means that the impact of an increase in 
is mitigated, making the countercyclical rule less e ective. This is again an illustration
of the Basel II-type regime being more procyclical than a Basel I-type, in which the risk
weight is constant.
35more volatile bank capital (as can be expected) but also increased volatility
in consumption and asset prices–and, by implication, other macroeconomic
variables.
This volatility trade-o  has important implications for the e ectiveness
of countercyclical regulatory rules and how aggressive these policies should
be. As in Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Silva (2011), suppose that the
central bank is concerned with two objectives, macroeconomic stability and
 nancial stability. The former is de ned in terms of the weighted average
of the coe cient of variation of the output gap (measured in terms of sales
on the domestic market) and of in ation (also in terms of the price of sales
on the domestic market), with weights of 0(3 and 0(7; thus, we consider
a central bank more concerned with in ation than output.37 The latter
objective is de ned in terms of the coe cient of variation of a weighted
average of nominal house prices and the nominal exchange rate, with equal
weights of 0(5, divided by the price of goods sold on the domestic market.38
Thus,  nancial volatility is measured in real terms, as a mix of both types of
asset prices.39 In addition, we de ne a composite index of economic stability,
de ned with two sets of weights:  rst with equal weight 0.5 to each objective
of stability, and second with a weight of 0.8 for macroeconomic stability and
0.2 for  nancial stability.40
Figures 7 and 8 shows the behavior of our measures of (in)stability sepa-
rately, and the index of economic stability, when the underlying shock is the
same as described earlier (a drop in the world risk-free rate), and for values of

  varying between 0 and 10.41 The  gure suggests that there is no trade-o 
37In turn, coe cients of variations are based on the asymptotic (unconditional) variances
of the relevant variable.
38The results are not highly sensitive to these weights.
39In general, there are three main channels through exchange rate volatility could un-
dermine  nancial stability. First, large currency movements could destabilise exchange
rate expectations, causing abrupt changes in capital  ows and inducing high volatility in
local currency debt and equity markets. Second, currency depreciation could exacerbate
currency mismatches (and thus undermine the creditworthiness) of domestic (bank and
nonbank) borrowers with large foreign-currency debts. Third, large depreciations could
be associated with a deterioration in external funding conditions during a crisis. In the
present setting, the  rst two channels are the more relevant ones–although, in practice,
the actual degree of currency mismatch depends on how far balance sheet exposures are
hedged (through o -balance sheet positions) in derivatives markets.
40We experimented with other weighting schemes as well but they did not make much
di erence in terms of the results; we do not report them to save space.
41Of, the maximum value of 10 is rather arbitrary, but this is su cient to illustrate our
36among policy objectives: a stronger response of regulatory capital to credit
gaps leads, in either case, to a reduction in both indicators of volatility–at
least up to a certain value. Indeed, the curves have a convex shape, which
indicates that the marginal bene t of countercyclical capital regulation di-
minishes as it becomes more aggressive (above 
  =4in the  gure). A
similar result holds for the index of economic stability; given our base cali-
bration, the marginal contribution of the regulatory capital rule to economic
stability is positive but decreases as the policy becomes more aggressive.
Intuitively, the reason for the convex relationship between volatility and
the strength with which the countercyclical capital rule responds to real
credit growth is as follows. As noted earlier, the countercyclical rule mitigates
the drop in the loan rate, which tends to reduce volatility in that variable.
At  rst, this e ect is not large, because the cost of issuing capital enters
with a relatively low coe cient, %#, in the loan rate-setting equation (see
(50)); but as 
  increases, it becomes also stronger. However, as the policy
becomes more aggressive, it also generates more volatility in bank capital
requirements, which then translate into higher volatility in the cost of issuing
capital. At the same time, higher volatility in bank capital increases (as
indicated earlier) volatility in the marginal value of wealth, consumption,
and real house prices–which, through higher volatility in the repayment
probability, raises volatility in the loan rate. In turn, this leads to higher
volatility in investment, aggregate demand, the policy rate, in ation (through
marginal costs) and other other macroeconomic variables, including foreign
bank borrowing and the exchange rate.42
Of course, if bank capital was accumulated exclusively through retained
earnings rather than by issuing capital, the volatility induced by the “cost
channel” of capital regulation would not operate. However, in a setting
where banks must indeed meet capital requirements by issuing costly debt,
as is the case here, the ability of a countercyclical regulatory rule to mitigate
reduce macroeconomic and  nancial volatility may be limited beyond a cer-
tain point. The same conclusion would naturally hold in a “mixed” system
where capital is built through both pro t accumulation and capital issuance,
the only di erence being that decreasing marginal returns (in terms of reduce
purpose.
42Because increases in 	
 reduce the demand for excess capital, when 

 is low changes
in that variable absorb some of the  uctuations in capital requirements, thereby imparting
greater inertia to total capital. However, as 

 increases, and movements in the cost of
issuing capital are magni ed, this mitigating role of excess capital becomes weaker.
37volatility) would begin to appear at a higher value of 
 .
Thus, to the extent that monetary policy has limited room for manoeuvre
(given the nature of the shock), a countercyclical regulatory rule is a comple-
mentary instrument–at least with respect to the shock considered–because
it helps to improve outcomes relative to both objectives. However, given di-
minishing marginal returns, other, more targeted macroprudential tools (such
as loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income limits, and reserve requirements) may
well be needed to mitigate macroeconomic and  nancial imbalances.
9 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a dynamic stochastic model
of a small open middle-income economy with a two-level banking interme-
diation structure, a risk-sensitive regulatory capital regime, and imperfect
capital mobility, to study the role of countercyclical regulatory policy in re-
sponse to capital  ows associated with foreign bank borrowing. In the model
 rms borrow from domestic banks and banks borrow on world capital mar-
kets, in both cases subject to an endogenous premium. The central bank
pursues a policy of reserve accumulation that depends on both trade and
 nancial factors. In line with the approach proposed by McCallum and Nel-
son (2000), imports are not treated as  nished consumer goods but rather
as intermediate goods, which are used (together with domestic intermediate
goods) in the production of the domestic  nal good. We argued that this
approach is particularly relevant for middle-income countries, where trade in
raw materials accounts for a very large share of imports.
A sudden  ood in foreign capital, induced by a drop in the world risk-
free interest rate, was shown to generate pressure on asset prices and an
economic boom, the magnitude of which depends on bank pricing behav-
ior and the nature of the regulatory regime. We also considered the role of
countercyclical capital regulation, taking the form of a Basel III-type rule,
under the assumption that monetary policy is constrained. Given the na-
ture of the shock that we consider, the reason for making that assumption
is that the central bank is concerned that by raising interest rates it runs
the risk of exacerbating capital in ows. As noted in the introduction, this is
a policy dilemma that many central banks in middle-income countries have
confronted in recent years. The policy was shown to be quite e ective–at
least for the shock considered–at promoting both macroeconomic and  nan-
38cial stability, with the latter de ned in terms of a composite index involving
nominal exchange rate volatility and volatility in real house prices. How-
ever, the gain in terms of reduced volatility may exhibit diminishing returns
beyond a certain point–essentially because regulatory-induced volatility in
capital holdings translates into volatility in lending and other macroeconomic
and  nancial variables, including foreign bank borrowing and the exchange
rate. In the end, an aggressive countercyclical capital regulatory rule may
do little to reduce the volatility of capital  ows. These results suggest that
a countercyclical regulatory policy may need to be supplemented by other,
more targeted, macroprudential instruments, such as loan-to-value, debt-to-
income, and leverage ratios. More generally, our experiments illustrate well
how the regulatory regime matters, given the monetary policy stance, in the
transmission of sudden  oods. Movements in repayment probabilities feed
into changes in risk weights under the Basel II-type regime that we consid-
ered, thereby a ecting the cost of issuing capital and bank pricing decisions.
A useful extension of the model would be to account for household bor-
rowing from banks. Even though it remains low (in proportion of GDP)
compared to industrial countries, this component of lending has increased sig-
ni cantly in middle-income countries like Brazil and Turkey in recent years–
partly as a result of domestic factors (notably the expansion of the middle
class in Brazil) but also partly as a result of large capital in ows. In Turkey
for instance, the expansion of domestic-currency loans has been closely as-
sociated with capital in ows. The reason for this expansion stems from the
fact that foreign investors were very involved in swap agreements with long
maturities. In these transactions, foreigners swap their domestic currency
holdings (bought in the  rst place from domestic residents) with foreign ex-
change held by domestic banks. Foreigners get a  xed rate of return on
domestic currency assets during the duration of the agreement, with domes-
tic banks earning LIBOR on their foreign exchange positions. Thus, domestic
banks can hedge the currency and interest rate risk by means of these agree-
ments. This allowed banks to extend credit in domestic currency at longer
maturities, making mortgage loans more a ordable for households. Thus,
capital in ows not only provided ample foreign exchange liquidity to banks
but also the opportunity to transform these funds to longer-term domestic-
currency loans. In recent years, capital in ows also had an indirect e ect on
credit to households, through their e ect on expected interest rates. Because
of the perception that lower interest rates abroad and strong capital in ows
would persist, domestic banks became convinced that domestic interest rates
39would not increase substantially over time. This prompted them to take more
interest rate risk and resulted in a lengthening of loan maturities–thereby
stimulating household demand for mortgages and magnifying the boom in
credit and output.
Another useful extension of our analysis would be to analyze the role
of controls on capital in ows, for instance by introducing a speci c tax on
bank borrowing abroad. Capital controls, unlike prudential tools, typically
involve discriminating between residents and non-residents. In general, the
evidence on their bene ts is mixed; there is no  rm support to the view
that they can be e ective at preventing  nancial instability and currency
crises.43 However, several countries continue to use them (e.g., Brazil, in the
form of a direct tax on  xed income and equity in ows) in the aftermath
of the recent global  nancial crisis. Because the e ectiveness of controls
is likely to di er both across countries as well as over time, it would be
worth exploring their use in a context where mitigating instability (rather
than preventing crises) is a key policy objective. Indeed, the issue here is to
which short-term capital controls can help to improve macroeconomic and
 nancial stability. There has been a paradigm shift in institutions like the
International Monetary Fund (2011), which suggests that capital controls
have proved e ective, at least to some extent, in improving macroeconomic
stability; the question that remains unanswered is the extent to which they
can help to improve  nancial stability, and if, under what conditions. Some
types of capital controls (e.g., exposure limits on foreign-currency borrowing,
or reserve requirements on foreign-currency deposits in domestic banks) are
tantamount to prudential measure–which are especially important when
in ows are intermediated through the regulated  nancial system. In the
model, this could be accounted for by assuming that foreign borrowing by
domestic banks is subject to a tax.
Notwithstanding these extensions, our analysis provides an important
framework for investigating the dilemmas that policymakers in middle-income
countries have faced in the aftermath of the global  nancial crisis, and op-
tions to respond to them. This has become especially relevant after the
implementation of unprecedented, unconventional monetary policy measures
 rst by the Federal Reserve Board and more recently the European Central
Bank. These measures resulted de facto in adding to an already low inter-
43See Edwards and Rigobon (2009), Binici, Hutchison, and Schindler (2010), Glick and
Hutchison (2011), and the overview in Agénor (2011).
40est rate environment the provision of ample liquidity to the global  nancial
system, thus exacerbating the features of our scenario of “sudden  oods”. In
many countries the policy response involved combining standard monetary
policy reaction to rising in ationary pressures with macroprudential mea-
sures (including higher bank capital requirements) to dampen the potentially
destabilizing e ects of large capital  ows on asset prices and credit markets.
These policies have been largely e ective although in some cases their com-
bination, in the context of well-established in ation targeting regimes, might
have complicated the task of forecasting in ation and anchoring expectations.
Our analysis has helped to shed light on the conditions under which the com-
bination of monetary and macroprudential policies can help to address the
policy challenges created by large capital in ows.
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Benchmark Calibration: Key Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
Household
 0(985 Discount factor
 0(6 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
	 4(5 Preference parameter for leisure
	 0(02 Preference parameter for money holdings
	 0(02 Preference parameter for housing
 0(35 Share parameter in index of money holdings
  1(0 Adjustment cost parameter, holdings of bank debt
Production
  0(7 distribution parameter,  nal good
	 0(8 Elasticity of substitution, baskets of IG goods
* 0(3 Adjustment speed, imported intermediate goods
  0(7 Price elasticity of exports
  10(0 Elasticity of demand, intermediate goods
, 0(35 Share of capital, domestic intermediate goods
/ 74(5 Adjustment cost parameter, IG prices
1 0(03 Depreciation rate of capital
  14 Adjustment cost parameter, investment
Commercial Bank
4 0(2 E ective collateral-loan ratio
71 0(03 Elasticity of repayment prob, collateral
72 1(5 Elasticity of repayment prob, cyclical output
7# 1(25 Elasticity of risk weight, prob of repayment
5 0(18 Cost of issuing bank capital
5 0(001 Bene t of holding excess bank capital
# 0(08 Capital adequacy ratio (deterministic component)
Central bank
* 0(1 Reserve requirement rate
8 0(0 Degree of interest rate smoothing
7 0(2 Speed of adjustment to reserve target
91 2(5 Response of re nance rate to in ation deviations
92 0(2 Response of re nance rate to output gap
93 0(0 Response of re nance rate to nominal depreciation
# 0(8 Persistence, shock to world risk-free rate
45Figure 1 
Bank Capital, Repayment Probability and the Lending Rate 
46Figure 2 
Base Experiment: Temporary Drop in World Risk-Free Interest Rate 
(Deviations from Steady State) 
Note: Interest rates, inflation rate and the repayment probability are measured in absolute 
deviations, that is, in the relevant graphs a value of 0.05 for these variables corresponds to a 5 percentage 
point deviation in absolute terms. RER denotes the real exchange rate, defined in terms of the prices 
domestic and imported intermediate goods. 
47Figure 3 
Increase in the Degree of Exchange Rate Pass-through 
(Deviations from Steady State) 
Note: See note to Figure 1.
48Figure 4 
Change in Speed of Adjustment to Reserve Target 
(Deviations from Steady State) 
Note: See note to Figure 1.
49Figure 5 
Positive Response of Policy Rate to Exchange Rate Depreciation 
(Deviations from Steady State) 
Note: See note to Figure 1.
50Figure 6 
Positive Response in Countercyclical Regulatory Capital Rule 
Note: See note to Figure 1.
51Figure 7 
Countercyclical Regulatory Capital Rule: 
Impact on Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Stability 
Note: The horizontal axis shows values of 
C, and the vertical axis the coefficient of variation of the 
relevant variable. Macroeconomic stability is measured in terms of nominal income stability, defined in terms of 
output and price of the final good, with equal weights. Financial stability is defined in terms of real house price 
volatility and nominal exchange rate volatility, with equal weights.
52Figure 8 
Countercyclical Regulatory Capital Rule: 
Impact on Composite Index of Economic Stability 
Note: The horizontal axis shows values of 
C, and the vertical axis the coefficient of variation of the 
relevant variable. Economic stability is defined in terms of nominal income stability and financial stability.
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